Signcryption is a public-key cryptographic primitive which combines the functions of public-key encryption and digital signature into a single logical step at low computational and communication costs. While multi-receiver signcryption is suited for a situation where a sender wants to send a signcrypted message to multiple receivers in a confidential and authenticated way. Due to this attractive property, recently, multi-receiver signcryption plays an important role in some practical applications such as virtual conference as well as authenticated mail transferring. In this paper, we present an efficient multi-receiver identity-based signcryption (MIBSC) scheme from lattice assumption which is believed to resist quantum computer attacks. The proposed scheme is provably secure in the random oracle model, which has the indistinguishability against chosen ciphertext attacks under the hardness of learning with errors (LWE), and existentially unforgeability against chosen message attacks under the small integer solution assumption (SIS). Moreover, we also compare our MIBSC scheme with existing schemes from performance efficiency and security, the result shows that our proposed scheme is more efficient and more secure. In particular, our scheme can be properly applied in the post-quantum communication environments.
Discrete Gaussian on lattice
Now we introduce Gaussian distribution on lattice (Gentry et al., 2008) briefly. Let Λ be a subset of , 
The LWE and SIS hardness assumptions
We recall the LWE and the SIS problems, which will be considered as average-case problems related to the family of modular lattices. We first denote an integer q = q(n), a Gaussian error distribution χ and a vector , a Z ∈ is uniformly random and x ∈ Z q is sampled from χ. The LWE problem is defined as follows (Regev, 2005) 
:
Definition 2: For an integer q = q(n) and a Gaussian error distribution χ on Z q , the goal of the learning with errors problem LWE q,χ is to distinguish between the distribution A s,χ for some random secret n q s Z ∈ and the uniform distribution on . and a real β, find a non-zero integer vector e ∈ Z m such that Ae = 0 mod q and 0 < || e || ≤ β.
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For functions q(n), m(n) and β(n), SIS q,m,β is the ensemble over instances (q(n), m(n), β(n)) where n m q A Z × ∈ is uniformly random.
Lemma 1 (see Regev, 2005) : Let q = q(n) be a prime and α = α(n) ∈ (0, 1) such that
If there is an efficient (possibly quantum) algorithm that solves LWE q,χ , then there is an efficient quantum algorithm for approximating shortest independent vectors problem and Gap shortest vectors problem in the l 2 norm, in the worst case, to within ( / ) O n α factors.
Lemma 2 (see Gentry et al., 2008) : For any poly-bounded m, β = poly(n) and for any prime q, the average-case problems SIS q,m,β is as hard as approximating the problems SIVP in the worst case to within certain factors ( ) ( ). γ n O n = β
Trapdoor functions and preimage sampleable functions
Now we show an algorithm that generates a uniform matrix 3 || T || = O(n log q) and || || log , T C n q ≤ for some absolute constant C < 40. Now, we utilise the technique in Gordon et al. (2010) to show how to recover an LWE instance (A, μ = A ⊥ s + e), where e is a short vector sampled from a discrete Gaussian distribution χ. Once we get the knowledge of the trapdoor T. Especially, if || T || < L = O(n log q) and e is drawn from Ψ 
Step 2. The algorithm is described as follows:
be the m columns of the matrix . The following lemma shows that R is sampled from a distribution close to . Moreover, the generated basis
with overwhelming probability.
Definitions of multi-receiver identity-based signcryption
In this section, we first give a general definition of multi-receiver identity-based signcryption for sending a single signcrypted ciphertext to multiple receivers which was first formalised in Duan and Cao (2006) .
Definition 4:
A multi-receiver identity-based signcryption (MIBSC) scheme consists of the following four probability polynomial time algorithms:
• Setup: Given a security parameter κ, the KGC generates a master public key mpk and a master secret key msk. The mpk is given to all interested parties while the msk is kept secret.
• Extract: Providing an identity ID received from a user and its master secret key msk as input, the KGC computes the corresponding secret key associated with ID, denoted by SK ID , and transmits it to ID in a secure way.
• Signcrypt: To send a message M to a set of receivers with identities are ID 1 , …, ID l respectively, the sender whose identity is ID s runs the signcrypt algorithm to obtain a signcryption
.
• Unsigncrypt: Upon receiving a signcryption C from the sender ID s , the receiver ID i runs the algorithm Unsigncrypt(C, , i ID SK ID s ) to obtain either the plaintext message M or invalid according to the fact whether the C was a valid signcryption.
For consistency, we require that if the signcryption ( , ,
Security definitions
Now we propose security models for confidentiality and unforgeability of MIBSC scheme given by Duan and Cao (2006) . During the selective identity attack, an adversary commits ahead of time to multiple target identities on which they will be challenged.
Confidentiality: In our multi-receiver identity-based signcryption scheme, with respect to confidentiality, we refer to it as indistinguishability of ciphertexts under selective multiple identities, chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-sMIBSC-CCA), which is defined as follows.
Definition 5: A multi-receiver identity-based signcryption scheme is semantically secure against chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-sMIBSC-CCA) if no probabilistic polynomial time adversary has a non-negligible advantage in the following game:
• Setup: The challenger B sends the system public key mpk to .
A After receiving the system parameter, the adversary A chooses a list of multiple target identities, denoted by 1 , , l ID ID * * … of users {R 1 , …, R l }, for which A is not allowed to query their secret keys.
• Phase 1: In this phase, A makes polynomial number of queries to the following oracles:
1 Secret key extraction queries: A produces an identity ID and queries for the secret key of user ID, the challenger runs the secret key extraction algorithm to get SK ID = Extract (msk, ID) . A restriction here is that 
SK
Finally, C is sent to A as a challenged signcryption.
• 
Strongly existential unforgeability:
A multi-receiver identity-based signcryption scheme against strong existential unforgeability under selective multi-identity, chosen message attacks (SUF-sMIBSC-CMA) is defined as follows.
Definition 6: A multi-receiver identity-based signcryption scheme is said to be strongly existential unforgeable against chosen-message attacks (SUF-sMIBSC-CMA) if no probabilistic polynomial time forger has a non-negligible advantage against a challenger B in the following game:
F After receiving the system parameter, the adversary F chooses a list of multiple target identities, denoted by 1 , , l ID ID * * … of users {R 1 , …, R l }, for which F is not allowed to query their secret keys.
• Attack: F makes polynomial number of queries to the same oracle as described in Definition 5.
• Forger: After a polynomial number queries as above during the attack phase, the In this section, we present our construction from lattice assumption that is based on the GPV signature scheme (Gentry et al., 2008) , and our scheme is motivated by Li et al. (2013) . Let k 0 be the identity length and k 1 be the message length. We assume a hash function H 1 that outputs matrix in • H O are randomly selected. Therefore, to maintain consistency, B will maintain three lists L 1 , L 2 and L 3 which are initialised to be empty. Actually, B plays the role of 's A challenger and works by interacting with A in a game defined as follows:
Security analysis
• Setup: B first obtains lm samples ( , )
≤ ≤ from the LWE oracle. Next, B parses these LWE samples as ( , ) 
The signcryption is 1 1 ( , , , , ) .
Since B does not know the secret key of ID s , C is generated by using a different method by , B it indeed generates a valid signcryption on message M from ID s to the set of receivers 1 . L
• Unsigncrypt queries: On receiving this query ( , , ( , , , , ), A Otherwise, B aborts.
• Challenge: After various queries in phase 1, A eventually outputs two plaintext messages M 0 , M 1 of equal length together with a sender's identity ID s on which he wishes to be challenged. A now waits for a challenged signcryption built under the receivers' identities 1 ( , O Thus, the solution of the LWE problem would be inserted in L 3 just at that moment and it does not matter whether the simulation of 's A view is no longer perfect.
• Guess: At the end of the simulation, A eventually outputs a bits b′ for which, A believes that the challenged signcryption w C * is the signcryption of M b′ from the sender to receiver . Otherwise, B aborts.
Now we calculate 's B probability of winning the game. We first set E to be the event that A queries the oracle 3 ( , ) H w w s e * * O during the simulation. Following the above discussion, we get that as long as the simulation of the attack's environment is perfect, the probability for E to happen is the same as in a real attack. In a real attack, we get that:
We consider the probability that the simulation is not perfect. The only case where it happens is when a valid signcryption is discarded in an unsigncrypt query. 
Comparison with existing schemes
Now we give the comparison of computational efficiency of our MIBSC scheme with existing classic multi-receiver signcryption schemes in Table 1 , and we also give the comparison of communication overhead and hard problems in Table 2 . Since the computation efficiency including signcryption cost and unsigncryption cost, and the communication overhead of signcrypted ciphertext are important factors affecting the performance of MIBSC, we present the comparison with respect to them. We consider the costly operations, which include modular exponentiation operation (Ex), modular multiplication operation (Mu), multiplication operation between a matrix and a vector (mu), exclusive or operation (XOR), pairing computation (Pa), hash funcition operation (H), inverse operation (In), and the preimage sampleable function operation (T sample ). Here, we don't consider the computation of the hash value of direct identities which can be precomputed for frequently communicating parties. Moreover, the number of bits in the representation of an element in G 1 and Z q are denoted by 1 , G ℓ q respectively. The number of bits in the representation of a message, an identity are denoted by e M and ℓ ID respectively, and the number of bits in the representation of L is denoted by ℓ L .
Table 1
Comparison of computational efficiency
Schemes Signcryption cost Unsigncryption cost Total cost
Duan and Cao Tables 1 and 2 , we can see that although our MIBSC scheme has greater communication overhead, there is no modular exponentiation operation, modular multiplication operation, pairing computation in our MIBSC scheme. Since the pairing computation and modular exponentiation operation are much more time-consuming, especially in the unsigncryption process, our scheme is absolute to be faster than the existing schemes. Moreover, our MIBSC scheme is based on the hardness of lattice assumption, thus it will be more advantage in post-quantum cryptographic environments. Therefore, considering the security and the performance efficiency, our scheme is much better and practical than existing schemes. 
Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed an efficient multi-receiver identity-based signcryption from hardness of lattice assumptions in the random oracle model. We have also proved our scheme is IND-sMIBSC-CCA secure under the LWE assumption and is SUF-sMIBSC-CMA secure under the SIS assumption. Meanwhile, compared with the existing schemes, our scheme can resist quantum attacks and performs faster. The extension of our MIIBSC scheme to an MIBSC scheme in the standard model will be our future work.
